

**Office of Internal Oversight Review**  
**Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal**  
**3755 North Nellis Boulevard – August 10, 2020**

**Purpose**

The purpose of this report is to publish key findings, conclusions, and/or recommendations of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's (LVMPD) internal review of this incident. A variety of actions can be taken administratively in response to the Department's review of a deadly force incident. The review may reveal no action is required or determine additional training is appropriate for all officers in the workforce, or only for the involved officer(s). The review may reveal the need for changes in Department policies, procedures, or rules. Where departmental rules have been violated, formal discipline may be appropriate. The goal of the review is to improve both individual and Department performance.

**Synopsis of Event**

On August 10, 2020, at approximately 0822 hours and 0941 hours, the LVMPD was involved in two critical incidents under LVMPD Event LLV200800039987. The incidents were related and occurred at the Storyville Trailer Park, 3755 North Nellis Boulevard Las Vegas, Nevada 89115. This address was located within the LVMPD Northeast Area Command (NEAC); sector beat Frank 3 (F3).

The incidents were two officer-involved shootings (OISs). The first OIS occurred at 0822 hours, and NEAC Officer Raul Cabrera was the involved officer. The second OIS occurred at 0941 hours, and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Officer Allyn Goodrich was the involved officer. Both officers discharged their firearms at suspect Joshua Squires who was armed with a firearm during both incidents.

Prior to the first OIS, Officer Cabrera and another officer were in the area of the Storyville Trailer Park reference an arson investigation. The suspect of the crime was identified as Squires who was presumed to reside at the trailer park. While at the property, officers spoke with an employee and confirmed Squires had been on the property earlier in the day.

Officer Cabrera, while in his LVMPD marked patrol vehicle, drove through the Storyville Trailer Park to locate Squires. Soon after, he located Squires walking near the community center of the trailer park. As he neared, Squires fled on foot from Officer Cabrera. At this time, Officer Cabrera exited his vehicle and initiated a foot pursuit.

Officer Cabrera followed Squires through the property toward an adjacent desert lot. As he fled, Squires produced a firearm which Officer Cabrera observed. He gave Squires multiple verbal commands to drop the firearm and to stop pointing the firearm at him. Next, Officer Cabrera broadcasted over the radio that Squires was armed with a firearm, informing responding officers on Squires escalating actions. As the foot pursuit continued and as Squires entered the desert lot, he turned toward Officer Cabrera and pointed his firearm at him. Officer Cabrera discharged one round from his duty weapon (handgun) toward Squires but missed. Squires turned away from Officer Cabrera and continued to run away from him, still armed with the firearm.

When he reached the other side of the desert lot, Squires climbed over a wall and ran back into the Storyville Trailer Park and entered his mother's residence. Containment was established around the trailer park by additional patrol officers. Next, they determined Squires was inside mobile home #51 and his mother was inside the trailer with him.

Patrol supervisors on scene declared the incident a barricaded subject and requested SWAT. SWAT, along with the Crisis Negotiators Team (CNT), responded to the incident and assumed control of the inner

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perimeter. During the standoff, SWAT confirmed Squires was still inside the residence. Additionally, it was learned Squires was still armed with a firearm and had taken his mother hostage. Patrol supervisors declared the incident as a hostage incident.

A hostage-rescue plan was established, and an entry team was designated. SWAT Officer Goodrich was tasked as the first entry officer for the entry team. Shortly after, the SWAT Commander issued the order to implement the hostage-rescue plan. SWAT officers, including SWAT Officer Goodrich, approached and entered the residence.

When SWAT Officer Goodrich entered the residence, Squires was armed with a handgun and pointed it at SWAT Officer Goodrich. SWAT Officer Goodrich discharged his rifle five times and Squires fell to the floor. Squires stood back up with the firearm, SWAT Officer Goodrich discharged his rifle six more times. Squires fell to the floor again.

With the assistance of additional SWAT officers, Squires' mother was evacuated, and the scene was secured. Medical personnel responded and declared Squires deceased on scene. Squires had multiple gunshot wounds from the encounter with SWAT Officer Goodrich.

### **The Criminal Investigation**

LVMPD Force Investigation Team (FIT) conducted the criminal investigation of this incident. The investigation was submitted to the District Attorney's Office for review. The District Attorney's Office determined that, "no criminal prosecution of the officer or officers involved in the referenced case is appropriate."

For additional information related to the investigation of this incident, please refer to LVMPD's FIT Report and the Clark County District Attorney's Legal Analysis Report and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Decision document.

### **LVMPD Administrative Review and Critical Incident Review Process**

It is the policy of this Department to provide LVMPD and the community with a thorough review of incidents wherein deadly force was used by Department members. The Critical Incident Review Process (CIRP) includes the participation of citizen board members who reside within the LVMPD jurisdiction, who are not personally affiliated with the Department, who are not related to any of its members, and who have not had prior law enforcement experience.

The CIRP is comprised of two related boards whose sole purpose is to conduct comprehensive administrative review of the tactics utilized by involved Department members as well as decision-making, Department policy, training, supervision, and the use of deadly force.

The Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) consists of commissioned and citizen members. The Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) presents the facts related to the use of deadly force. The board issues findings regarding the actions of Department members who used, directly ordered, or directly influenced the use of deadly force, whether such force resulted in death or serious injury. The UFRB may choose from one of four findings after hearing the presentation of facts from CIRT. The findings are Administrative Approval, Tactics/Decision-Making, Policy/Training Failure, or Administrative Disapproval.

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The Tactical Review Board (TRB) reviews CIRT conclusions. The TRB can validate, overturn, or modify the conclusions regarding the actions of Department members.

The matter was heard by the UFRB and TRB on January 21, 2020. Below are the key findings, conclusions, and/or recommendations from the CIRT determined by the UFRB and TRB members and approved by the Sheriff.

### **Use of Force Review Board**

#### **UFRB: Officer Raul Cabrera**

The board's finding was Administrative Approval for Officer Cabrera's OIS. Administrative Approval is defined as: "objectively reasonable force was used under the circumstances, based on the information available to the officers at the time." This finding acknowledges that the use of force was justified and within Department policy.

#### **UFRB: SWAT Officer Allyn Goodrich**

The board's finding was Administrative Approval for both volleys of fire during SWAT Officer Goodrich's OIS. Administrative Approval is defined as: "objectively reasonable force was used under the circumstances, based on the information available to the officers at the time." This finding acknowledges that the use of force was justified and within Department policy.

### **Tactical Review Board**

#### **Communication**

Communication can be verbal or non-verbal. It includes electronic transmission or in-person. A review of these recordings can provide valuable evidence of the circumstances surrounding a particular event.

During the incident, Officer Cabrera and another officer were attempting to locate Squires. Officer Cabrera observed Squires and initiated a foot pursuit. Officer Cabrera relayed the proper radio traffic, however due to another officer simultaneously relaying information over the radio, Officer Cabrera's radio traffic was not relayed to the dispatcher. Officer Cabrera continued to broadcast all the appropriate information until supervisors arrived.

- The administrative review determined the radio traffic was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

The overall call screening, processing, and interaction techniques utilized by call-takers in the critical incident were completed and the information from various units involved was accurately logged. Additionally, the call-takers initiated and handled multiple tasks related to the officer involved shooting.

- The administrative review determined the handling and documentation of the call screening, processing, and interaction for the 9-1-1 call by call-takers was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

During the incident, the related information being given by officers was accurately updated by dispatchers for responding units, including informing their supervisors of an officer involved shooting occurring. The

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communications supervisors then completed the necessary tasks and proper notification for an officer involved shooting.

- The administrative review determined the information sharing by the call-takers was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

**De-escalation**

Policing requires that at times an officer must exercise control of a violent or resisting subject to make an arrest or to protect the officer, other officers, or members of the community from risk of harm. Clearly, not every potential violent confrontation can be de-escalated, but officers do have the ability to impact the direction and the outcome of many situations based on their decision-making and the tactics they choose to employ. As a strategy to diminish the likelihood and the severity of force, officers will attempt to de-escalate confrontations.

Officer Cabrera parked his vehicle, exited, and initiated a foot pursuit with Squires immediately after he observed him. Officer Cabrera continued to run after Squires in an off-set position as Squires retrieved a firearm from his pants and pointed at him several times.

- The administrative review determined Officer Cabrera’s approach was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

At the beginning of the foot pursuit with Squires, Officer Cabrera was alone. Officer Cabrera chased Squires through an alleyway, into an open desert lot while he continued to give him verbal commands to stop and drop the gun after Squires was observed with a firearm. Officer Cabrera took the position of contact and cover officer until an additional officer arrived with him.

- The administrative review determined Officer Cabrera’s contact and cover was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

SWAT Officer Goodrich was near the initial incident as it occurred. SWAT Officer Goodrich arrived on scene quickly and assisted with the preplanning and allocation of resources. Due to SWAT Officers Goodrich’s preplanning he was able to assemble resources with multiple force options, quickly and safely.

- The administrative review determined SWAT Officer Goodrich’s preplanning was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

SWAT Officer Goodrich was deployed to Squires residence with additional SWAT team members who became the Incident Action Team (IAT). SWAT Officer Goodrich took up a position of cover and concealment directly in front of the residence, which was the most viable option at the time due to the exigency of the situation.

- The administrative review determined SWAT Officer Goodrich’s approach was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As SWAT team members were given the order to make entry to Squires’ residence, SWAT Officer Goodrich was in the lead position. SWAT Officer Goodrich made entry to the residence fired one volley of fire at

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Squires who fell to the ground. As Squires stood back up with a firearm, Officer Goodrich fired a second volley, simultaneously additional SWAT officers were able to make entry.

- The administrative review determined Officer Goodrich's use of contact and cover was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Officer Cabrera chased Squires through an alleyway to an open field. It was not until Officer Cabrera and Squires had reached the open field that the firearm was observed in Squires hand. During this time Officer Cabrera had already by passed all cover and concealment from the alleyway. Another officer arrived with a patrol vehicle and Officer Cabrera took cover behind it. Officer Cabrera and the additional officer took appropriate roles until they lost visual of Squires.

- The administrative review determined Officer Cabrera's used of contact and cover was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Officer Goodrich entered the residence first. After Officer Goodrich fired the first volley, he was able to move further into the residence and allow himself and additional officers inside the residence. As he moved further inside the residence Officer Goodrich re-engaged Squires with a second volley, because Squires had stood back up armed with a handgun.

- The administrative review determined Officer Goodrich did not used cover and concealment while in contact with Squires, who was known to be armed. Due to the hindering situation the tactic of cover and concealment are obsolete and cannot be positioned; therefore, Officer Goodrich's actions were reasonable, and his use of cover and concealment was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

#### **Use of Deadly Force**

It is the policy of this Department that officers hold the highest regard for the dignity and liberty of all persons and place minimal reliance upon the use of force. The Department respects the sanctity of every human life, and the application of deadly force is a measure to be employed in the most extreme circumstances where lesser means of force have failed or could not be reasonably considered.

The Department seeks to manage use of force beyond the Graham v. Connor (1989) standard and its minimum requirements by establishing further parameters for the application of force and to offer explicit direction to officers. Sound judgment, the appropriate exercise of discretion, and the adherence to Department policy will always be the foundation of officer decision-making in the broad range of possible use of force situations.

Officers will only use a level of force that is objectively reasonable to bring an incident or persons under control and to safely accomplish a lawful purpose. An officer's use of force must balance against the level of resistance exhibited by the subject. The level of force administered by an officer must be carefully controlled and should not be more than objectively reasonable to overcome the physical harm threatened.

In a confrontation, an officer will continuously reassess their response and adjust any use of force accordingly based upon the level of resistance encountered. Failure to reassess each application of force

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can lead to a violation of law and/or policy. The use of force by an officer must be within Department Policy which may be more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution.

Officer Cabrera observed Squires running with a firearm in his right hand. Officer Cabrera then drew his firearm in response. Squires then pointed the firearm at Officer Cabrera several times while Officer Cabrera gave verbal commands to stop, drop the gun, stop pointing it at him, and get on the ground.

- The administrative review determined Officer Cabrera's drawing of his firearm was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

When Officer Cabrera discharged his firearm at Squires, he was approximately 14 yards away from him. Officer Cabrera's backdrop was an unobstructed view of Squires and a large dirt lot, with a cinder block behind him.

- The administrative review determined Officer Cabrera's assessment of backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Officer Cabrera was in foot pursuit with Squires in an open field. As Squires ran away from Officer Cabrera, Squires produced a firearm and pointed it at Cabrera several times, ignoring commands to drop the gun.

- The administrative review determined Officer Cabrera's threat assessment was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

SWAT Officer Goodrich arrived on a Hostage barricade incident from which an OIS had previously occurred. Additionally, as SWAT Officer Goodrich made entry, it was known Squires was armed with a firearm.

- The administrative review determined SWAT Officer Goodrich's drawing of his firearm was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

When SWAT Officer Goodrich discharged his firearm during both volleys of fire, his background was a kitchen area with cabinets and a wall.

- SWAT Officer Goodrich's assessment of backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

During his first volley, as SWAT Officer Goodrich entered the residence, Squires was armed with a firearm in his hand and pointed it at SWAT Officer Goodrich. During the second volley, Squires stood up from the kitchen area with the firearm still in his hand and faced SWAT Officer Goodrich.

- The administrative review determined SWAT Officer Goodrich's threat assessment for both volleys of fire were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

**Incident Management**

Supervisors will possess a thorough knowledge of tactics and ensure that officers under their supervision perform to a standard, in accordance with LVMPD policy and training. The prospect of a favorable outcome

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is often enhanced when supervisors become involved in the management of the overall response to a potentially violent encounter by coordinating officers' tactical actions.

Supervisors will acknowledge and respond to incidents in a timely manner when officer use of reportable force is probable. Supervisors will also manage the deployment of resources and equipment. In dynamic and highly charged incidents, supervisors will provide clear direction and communication to officers regarding their positioning and roles. Upon observing substandard officer approaches or flaws in tactical decisions, the supervisor will promptly act to correct any deficiencies.

In review of the supervisory response for this incident, all patrol supervisors responded appropriately to the initial OIS and hostage barricade address; followed by a second OIS at 3755 North Nellis Boulevard.

During the incident, the SWAT Commander recognized the situation, coordinated SWAT's response, and quickly arrived on scene. As the incident escalated and while on scene, the SWAT Commander determined a crisis entry was necessary due to the exigent circumstances to save the life of Squire's mother.

- The administrative review determined all patrol supervisors managed the incident within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.
- The administrative review determined the SWAT Commander managed the incident within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

**Additional Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations**

As the hostage barricade incident was occurring, medical was requested to stage for immediate response. Immediately after shots were fired by SWAT Officer Goodrich, a SWAT supervisor requested the SWAT tactical medic. The tactical medic addressed Squires injuries and attempted to render aid; however, Squires was later pronounced deceased.

- The administrative review determined the medical response in this incident was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

After SWAT Officer Goodrich's shooting it was determined his rifle's magazine was loaded with 31 rounds and he had 29 rounds loaded in his spare rifle magazine. Per LVMPD department policy a rifle magazine will be loaded to 28 rounds.

- The administrative review determined SWAT Officer Goodrich's magazines were not loaded properly; therefore, he was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.