

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

Purpose

The purpose of this report is to publish key findings, conclusions, and/or recommendations of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's (LVMPD) internal review of this incident. A variety of actions can be taken administratively in response to the Department's review of a deadly force incident. The review may reveal no action is required or determine additional training is appropriate for all officers in the workforce, or only for the involved officer(s). The review may reveal the need for changes in Department policies, procedures, or rules. Where departmental rules have been violated, formal discipline may be appropriate. The goal of the review is to improve both individual and Department performance.

Synopsis of Event

On September 9, 2020, at approximately 0015 hours, the LVMPD was involved in a critical incident under LVMPD Event LLV200900037374. The incident occurred near 2650 Las Vegas Boulevard South, Las Vegas, Nevada 89109. This address was located within the LVMPD Convention Center Area Command (CCAC); sector beat Mary 2 (M2).

The incident was an officer-involved shooting (OIS) and Officers Nicholas Grazioso, Francisco Mazon, Shaun Ward, and Gregory Hilton were the involved officers who discharged their firearms at suspect Matthew Patton, who was armed with two knives. Patton was struck multiple times and was later pronounced deceased, on-scene, by medical units.

Prior to the OIS, on September 8, 2020, at approximately 2309 hours, an officer conducted a vehicle stop near Joe W. Brown Drive and Karen Avenue, Las Vegas, NV 89109. The vehicle stop was conducted on a red sedan driven by Patton. During the encounter, Patton identified himself via a Utah driver's license. A record check revealed Patton had an extraditable felony warrant for Burglary from the state of Utah. In the record check, there was information that Patton was armed and dangerous and non-compliant for a sexual assault. A lieutenant monitoring the radio asked for clarifying details about the record check. The LVMPD dispatcher broadcasted over the radio that Patton had violent tendencies and was a violent sexual predator.

With the arrival of additional officers, Patton was asked to exit his vehicle, but he refused to comply. This was broadcast over the radio. It was also broadcast that Patton was in possession of a pocketknife. For over 20 minutes, officers attempted to negotiate with Patton. While this occurred, other officers attempted to contain Patton by using their LVMPD marked patrol vehicles to block his vehicle in. Before this could be done, Patton placed his vehicle in drive and fled from the area.

The officer who initially stopped Patton decided not to initiate a vehicle pursuit. As additional officers located Patton's vehicle, they initiated a vehicle pursuit. However, the area sergeant discontinued the pursuit. Shortly after, a traffic officer broadcast over the radio he had located Patton's vehicle and was following it. The traffic officer advised he was not in pursuit and was "a ways back" from Patton's vehicle. The lieutenant broadcast over the radio for all officers to keep their distance and to "bubble" Patton's vehicle. Approximately nine (9) minutes after the vehicle pursuit was discontinued, the Air Unit was requested to assist and subsequently began surveillance of Patton's vehicle.

Officer Mazon and his partner were directed by their supervisor to assign themselves to the incident. Officer Mazon and his partner were acting in a plainclothes capacity and driving in an unmarked vehicle. Neither Officer Mazon nor his partner broadcast over the radio they had been assigned to the call until 17 minutes

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

after they were assigned. Additionally, Officer Mazon and his partner did not provide any information to uniformed officers about their intent while assigned to the incident.

While the Air Unit was surveilling, approximately 14 police vehicles caravanned behind Patton's vehicle to include a second sergeant. The sergeant who canceled the initial vehicle pursuit advised over the radio for officers to utilize stop sticks on Patton's vehicle. Afterward, an officer deployed a stop stick near the area of Desert Inn Road and Rainbow Boulevard. The application of the stop stick was successful and caused two of Patton's tires to deflate. Patton's vehicle did not stop. Instead, Patton continued to flee from officers even with the tires completely deflated.

As Patton drove eastbound on Sahara Avenue and neared Las Vegas Boulevard, an officer asked over the radio if units were authorized to deploy a second set of stop sticks. The lieutenant monitoring the incident authorized the deployment. The officer deployed the stop stick on Sahara Avenue, west of Las Vegas Boulevard. This time, the stop stick deployment was not successful because Patton was able to maneuver his vehicle around them.

When Patton turned northbound on Las Vegas Boulevard South, the lieutenant advised officers to initiate a Precision Intervention Technique (PIT) on Patton's vehicle. Officer Hilton approached Patton's vehicle in his LVMPD marked patrol vehicle, activated his emergency equipment, and attempted a PIT on Las Vegas Boulevard South (south of Sahara Avenue) but was unsuccessful. Officer Hilton approached Patton's vehicle a second time and initiated another PIT. This time it was successful, and Patton's vehicle stopped on Las Vegas Boulevard South.

Immediately after the successful PIT, Patton and Officer Hilton exited their vehicles. Patton was armed with a knife and charged Officer Hilton. Officer Hilton drew his firearm and instructed Patton to get on the ground. Patton stopped, but he did not comply with Officer Hilton's verbal commands to get on the ground. Rather, Patton changed direction and ran away from Officer Hilton, reaching into his waistband with his right hand as he ran. Officer Hilton initiated a foot pursuit and told Patton, "Don't reach for it" while they ran southbound in the middle of Las Vegas Boulevard South.

Officer Hilton issued additional verbal commands for Patton to get on the ground and to drop his knife, but he did not comply. When additional officers arrived, to include Officers Mazon, Grazioso, and Ward, they approached Patton and issued verbal commands for him to drop his knife. Patton disregarded all officers' verbal commands for approximately 35 seconds before he took off his jacket. Patton then escalated the incident by arming himself with a second knife he had in a scabbard hanging around his neck.

While brandishing the two knives, Patton walked backward (facing the officers) on Las Vegas Boulevard South away from the officers. Officer Hilton positioned himself in a manner that provided adequate distance and allowed him to maintain a visual of Patton. Officer Hilton made numerous efforts to persuade Patton to put the knives down. As Officer Mazon approached Officer Hilton, he positioned himself behind and to the right of him. Officer Mazon then communicated with Officer Hilton to have him transition to his ECD.

Before Officer Hilton could transition to his ECD, Patton turned and charged toward the officers, still armed with both knives. Officers Hilton and Mazon discharged their firearms at Patton. After the volley of fire, Patton changed his direction slightly and fled toward the center median of Las Vegas Boulevard South. He

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

briefly ran behind a power box and then ran behind two palm trees in the direction of officers, still armed with the knives.

While Patton was between the two palm trees, just past the power box, a K-9 sergeant deployed his canine. Patton was able to avoid the canine and continued to rush toward officers. As Patton rushed toward the officers, he dropped his knives. Simultaneously, Officers Ward and Grazioso discharged their firearms at Patton who immediately collapsed onto Las Vegas Boulevard South.

Officers approached Patton and took him into custody. The K-9 sergeant on scene instructed officers to request medical personnel, remove Patton from handcuffs (if he was not resisting), and begin lifesaving measures on him. Officers immediately provided medical assistance by attempting to locate wounds and utilized a tourniquet on Patton's right leg. A short time later, medical personnel arrived on the scene and determined Patton to be deceased.

The Criminal Investigation

The LVMPD Force Investigation Team (FIT) conducted the criminal investigation of this incident. The investigation was submitted to the District Attorney's Office for review. The District Attorney's Office determined that, "no criminal prosecution of the officers involved in the above-referenced event number is appropriate."

For additional information related to the investigation of this incident, please refer to the LVMPD's FIT Report and the Clark County District Attorney's Legal Analysis Report and/or the Clark County District Attorney's Decision document.

LVMPD Administrative Review and Critical Incident Review Process

It is the policy of this Department to provide LVMPD and the community with a thorough review of incidents wherein deadly force was used by Department members. The Critical Incident Review Process (CIRP) includes the participation of citizen board members who reside within the LVMPD jurisdiction, who are not personally affiliated with the Department, who are not related to any of its members, and who have not had prior law enforcement experience.

The CIRP is comprised of two related boards whose sole purpose is to conduct comprehensive administrative review of the tactics utilized by involved Department members as well as decision-making, Department policy, training, supervision, and the use of deadly force.

The Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) consists of commissioned and citizen members. The Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) presents the facts related to the use of deadly force. The board issues findings regarding the actions of Department members who used, directly ordered, or directly influenced the use of deadly force, whether such force resulted in death or serious injury. The UFRB may choose from one of four findings after hearing the presentation of facts from CIRT. The findings are Administrative Approval, Tactics/Decision-Making, Policy/Training Failure, or Administrative Disapproval.

The Tactical Review Board (TRB) reviews CIRT conclusions. The TRB can validate, overturn, or modify the conclusions regarding the actions of Department members.

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

The matter was heard by the UFRB and the TRB on February 18, 2021. Below are the key findings, conclusions, and/or recommendations from the CIRP determined by the UFRB and TRB members and approved by the Sheriff.

Use of Force Review Board

UFRB: Officers Gregory Hilton, Francisco Mazon, Shaun Ward, and Nicholas Grazioso

The board's finding was Administrative Approval. Administrative Approval is defined as: "Objectively reasonable force was used under the circumstances, based on the information available to the officers at the time." This finding acknowledges that the use of force was justified and within Department policy.

Tactical Review Board

Communication

Communication can be verbal or non-verbal. It includes electronic transmission or in-person. A review of these recordings can provide valuable evidence of the circumstances surrounding a particular event.

A review of the audio files from the LVMPD Communications Bureau was conducted. The review included the radio traffic between dispatchers, officers, and supervisors assigned to the incident. The audio files were compared to the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) document, which did not show any discrepancies.

- The administrative review determined all Communications personnel were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Officer Mazon and his partner were directed by their supervisor to assign themselves to the incident. Officer Mazon and his partner were acting in a plainclothes capacity and did not broadcast over the radio they were assigned to the call until 17 minutes after they were assigned. Additionally, Officer Mazon and his partner did not provide any information to uniformed officers as to their role in the incident. If they had stated their intent, it could have made supervisors aware of their involvement and provided them with additional tactical options.

- The administrative review determined the communication and broadcasting of information for Officer Mazon and his partner were not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation

Policing requires that at times an officer must exercise control of a violent or resisting subject to make an arrest or to protect the officer, other officers, or members of the community from risk of harm. Clearly, not every potential violent confrontation can be de-escalated, but officers do have the ability to impact the direction and the outcome of many situations based on their decision-making and the tactics they choose to employ. As a strategy to diminish the likelihood and the severity of force, officers will attempt to de-escalate confrontations.

De-escalation: Miscellaneous

A traffic officer arrived in the area and broadcast information he had located Patton's vehicle and was following. A sergeant confirmed with the officer whether he was in "pursuit." The officer broadcast he was not in pursuit and was "a ways back" from the vehicle. During a review of the officer's body worn camera (BWC), subject matter experts (SMEs) determined the officer was in pursuit and did not properly apply the

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

bubble tactic during the incident. The BWC also showed him to commit several traffic violations including speeding and not fully stopping at stop signs.

- The administrative review determined the traffic officer's actions during his approach to the suspect vehicle after the pursuit had been initially discontinued and joining the "caravan" behind Patton's vehicle were not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As Patton traveled eastbound on Sahara Avenue, a review of multiple BWCs revealed approximately 14 LVMPD marked patrol units, not including Officer Ward and Officer Mazon, traveled together while following Patton's vehicle. BWC appeared to show marked patrol units "caravanning" without any authorization from a supervisor. Because this incident passed through multiple area commands, marked patrol units joined the incident but were never given authorization, nor were they ever given any roles or responsibilities by the supervisors monitoring the pursuit.

- The administrative review determined the approach of numerous officers as they caravanned behind Patton's vehicle was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

An officer used his radio to re-affirm authorization to deploy a second set of stop sticks, as Patton's vehicle traveled eastbound on Sahara Avenue and approached Las Vegas Boulevard. A lieutenant authorized the use of stop sticks a second time. The officer deployed the stop stick on Sahara Avenue just west of Las Vegas Boulevard. The stop stick deployment was not successful as Patton was able to maneuver his vehicle around the stop stick. Surveillance video showed the officer failed to utilize any cover or concealment as he deployed the stop stick. The officer was in the travel lanes of East Sahara Avenue, which overexposed him to Patton's vehicle.

- The administrative review determined the officer's use of cover and concealment during his deployment of the stop stick were not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation: Officer Hilton

Officer Hilton assigned himself to the call after hearing a lieutenant request a unit to implement the PIT tactic on Patton's vehicle if it turned onto Las Vegas Boulevard. Officer Hilton arrived on scene and positioned his vehicle eastbound on Sahara Avenue, just east of Las Vegas Boulevard, and waited for Patton's vehicle to pass. Patton drove past Officer Hilton who then pulled in behind Patton, positioning his vehicle to initiate the PIT tactic.

- The administrative review determined that Officer Hilton's preplanning was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

CIRT and additional SMEs discussed Officer Hilton's PIT applications to include Officer Hilton's threat assessment. CIRT and the SMEs considered the totality of circumstances Officer Hilton knew at the time.

- The administrative review determined that based on the circumstances known at the time of incident, the information available, and totality of the circumstances, Officer Hilton's PIT applications and his threat assessment were with standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

After the successful PIT, Officer Hilton exited his patrol vehicle as Patton exited his vehicle armed with a knife. While Patton charged toward the officer, Officer Hilton drew his firearm and instructed him to get on the ground. Patton changed direction and ran away from Officer Hilton who initiated a foot pursuit. As Officer Hilton closed the distance, Patton (still armed) turned toward him but continued to walk backwards. Officer Hilton immediately stopped and raised his firearm, pointing it at Patton who was still armed with a knife.

- The administrative review determined Officer Hilton’s approach to Patton was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As Patton continued to walk backwards, while armed with two knives, Officer Hilton positioned himself in a manner that provided adequate distance, allowing him to maintain a visual of Patton. Officer Hilton made numerous efforts to persuade Patton to put the knives down.

- The administrative review determined Officer Hilton’s role of contact officer in this incident was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation: Officer Mazon

At the request of his supervisor, Officer Mazon, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, assigned himself to the call and immediately proceeded to the area of Patton’s vehicle. After Officer Hilton conducted a successful PIT maneuver, Officer Mazon exited his vehicle and approached Officer Hilton.

- The administrative review determined Officer Mazon’s preplanning was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As Officer Mazon approached Officer Hilton, who was following Patton on foot, he positioned himself behind and to the right of Officer Hilton. Officer Mazon then communicated with Officer Hilton to have him transition to his ECD. However, it would have been more tactically advantageous for Officer Mazon to draw his ECD since Officer Hilton was already providing lethal cover.

- The administrative review determined Officer Mazon’s approach to Patton was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.
- The administrative review determined Officer Mazon’s contact/cover was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation: Officer Ward

Officer Ward assigned himself to the call after Patton’s vehicle entered the Spring Valley Area Command (SVAC) jurisdiction. During the incident, BWC showed an officer deploy a stop stick on Patton’s vehicle successfully, which caused the two tires on the right side of the vehicle to deflate. As this occurred, Officer Ward acted as the cover officer when the stop stick was deployed.

- The administrative review determined Officer Ward’s preplanning was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

After Officer Hilton successfully conducted a PIT maneuver and exited his vehicle, Officer Ward arrived at the scene and approached Patton. Officer Ward drew his firearm and continued to track Patton while walking south on Las Vegas Boulevard, on the west side of the street, near the sidewalk, and away from Patton. As Patton, armed with two knives, charged at officers, Officer Ward moved across Las Vegas Boulevard toward the center median and closed distance on Patton.

- The administrative review determined Officer Ward’s approach to Patton was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation: Officer Grazioso

Officer Grazioso and his partner were completing administrative tasks when the radio traffic of the pursuit was broadcast. Initially, a Bolden Area Command (BAC) acting sergeant instructed BAC officers not to get involved in the incident. However, a BAC sergeant requested units position themselves at the entrance of the Palace Station Hotel and Casino in the event the suspect attempted to flee into the hotel. Officer Grazioso and his partner assigned themselves to the incident and parked their patrol vehicle at the entrance to the Palace Station Hotel and Casino.

- The administrative review determined that Officer Grazioso’s preplanning was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As Patton’s vehicle continued west on Sahara Avenue and passed the Palace Station Hotel and Casino, Officer Grazioso and his partner joined the pursuit. The officers failed to notify LVMPD Communications or their supervisor of their intent to join the incident.

- The administrative review determined Officer Grazioso and his partner’s approach were not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation: Officers Hilton, Mazon, Ward, and Grazioso

Officers Hilton, Mazon, Ward, and Grazioso were on foot, following Patton, who was walking southbound on Las Vegas Boulevard, armed with two knives. Las Vegas Boulevard was an open area that did not provide adequate cover or concealment, while still allowing them to maintain visual of Patton. Officers did not have cover or concealment while engaging Patton but did maintain distance while still attempting to keep him contained.

- The administrative review determined officers Hilton, Mazon Ward, and Grazioso’s cover/concealment were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Use of Deadly Force

It is the policy of this Department that officers hold the highest regard for the dignity and liberty of all persons and place minimal reliance upon the use of force. The Department respects the sanctity of every human life, and the application of deadly force is a measure to be employed in the most extreme circumstances where lesser means of force have failed or could not be reasonably considered.

The Department seeks to manage use of force beyond the Graham v. Connor (1989) standard and its minimum requirements by establishing further parameters for the application of force and to offer explicit direction to officers. Sound judgment, the appropriate exercise of discretion, and the adherence to

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

Department policy will always be the foundation of officer decision-making in the broad range of possible use of force situations.

Officers will only use a level of force that is objectively reasonable to bring an incident or persons under control and to safely accomplish a lawful purpose. An officer's use of force must balance against the level of resistance exhibited by the subject. The level of force administered by an officer must be carefully controlled and should not be more than objectively reasonable to overcome the physical harm threatened.

In a confrontation, an officer will continuously reassess their response and adjust any use of force accordingly based upon the level of resistance encountered. Failure to reassess each application of force can lead to a violation of law and/or policy. The use of force by an officer must be within Department Policy which may be more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution.

Use of Deadly Force – Drawing of a Firearm:

Officers Hilton and Mazon drew their firearms because Patton had a felony warrant for Burglary, was known to have violent tendencies, was non-compliant with his sexual assault registry, and was armed with a knife walking south on Las Vegas Boulevard.

- The administrative review determined the drawing of Officers Hilton and Mazon's firearms were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Officers Ward and Grazioso drew their firearms after Patton charged Officer Hilton on Las Vegas Boulevard armed with a knife.

- The administrative review determined the drawing of Officers Ward and Grazioso's firearms were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Use of Deadly Force – Backdrop, Target Identification, and Isolation:

As Officer Hilton discharged his firearm, his backdrop was a sidewalk, fence, and a parking lot.

- The administrative review determined Officer Hilton's backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As Officer Mazon discharged his firearm, his backdrop was a fence and palm trees.

- The administrative review determined Officer Mazon's backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

As Officer Ward discharged his firearm, his backdrop was an empty field and palm trees.

- The administrative review determined Officer Ward's backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

As Officer Grazioso discharged his firearm, his backdrop was a power box, jersey barrier, and a block wall.

- The administrative review determined Officer Grazioso's backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Use of Deadly Force – Threat Assessment:

During the critical incident, Patton was armed with two knives and did not comply with Officer Hilton's verbal commands. Patton, while armed with two knives, ran toward Officers Hilton, Mazon, Ward, and Officer Grazioso.

- The administrative review determined Officer's Hilton, Mazon, Ward, and Grazioso's threat assessment were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Incident Management

Supervisors will possess a thorough knowledge of tactics and ensure that officers under their supervision perform to a standard (in accordance with LVMPD policy and training). The prospect of a favorable outcome is often enhanced when supervisors become involved in the management of the overall response to a potentially violent encounter by coordinating officers' tactical actions.

Supervisors will acknowledge and respond to incidents in a timely manner when officer use of reportable force is probable. Supervisors will also manage the deployment of resources and equipment. In dynamic and highly-charged incidents, supervisors will provide clear direction and communication to officers regarding their positioning and roles. Upon observing substandard officer approaches or flaws in tactical decisions, the supervisor will promptly act to correct any deficiencies.

Patton's warrant had the original crime listed as Burglary. According to LVMPD policy, Burglary is a property crime and does not meet vehicle pursuit criteria. Shortly after Patton fled from the original car stop location, a vehicle pursuit was initiated but a sergeant made the decision to discontinue it.

After he had discontinued the vehicle pursuit, the sergeant requested officers utilize stop sticks on Patton's vehicle. Per LVMPD policy, stop sticks are only to be utilized on vehicles that meet vehicle pursuit criteria. The sergeant did not broadcast any direction to officers if the vehicle pursuit met pursuit criteria or if a vehicle pursuit was now authorized.

- The administrative review determined the sergeant's incident management of the vehicle pursuit and stop stick deployment was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

A second sergeant was assigned to the critical incident and remained assigned throughout the duration of the event. The second sergeant did not make any attempt to clarify the first sergeant's request to use stop sticks. Additionally, the second sergeant did not make it clear to officers if the vehicle pursuit criteria had been met or if a vehicle pursuit was now authorized.

The second sergeant was part of the caravan of approximately 14 LVMPD marked patrol units following Patton's vehicle. Caravanning is prohibited by LVMPD policy, and the second sergeant did not broadcast to officers to cease the caravanning or make any attempts to correct the situation.

Office of Internal Oversight Review
Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations of an Officer-Involved Shooting: Fatal
2650 South Las Vegas Boulevard – September 9, 2020

Upon completion of the successful PIT, the second sergeant arrived near the scene but showed no sense of urgency after exiting his vehicle and failed to accurately assess the situation to include: life safety; incident stabilization; and property preservation. After the OIS, the second sergeant ran toward officers and the scene. However, he failed to take control, provide officers with any roles or responsibilities, or coordinate any additional resources.

- The administrative reviewed determined the second sergeant's incident management was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

A K-9 sergeant assigned himself to the incident after the first sergeant requested officers deploy stop sticks on Patton's vehicle. The K-9 sergeant arrived at the intersection of West Sahara Avenue and South Decatur Boulevard and moved towards the area of Patton's vehicle. The K-9 sergeant broadcast over the radio not to approach Patton's vehicle after the first PIT had been executed. After the successful PIT, The K-9 sergeant attempted to verbally give on-scene officers roles and responsibilities to include deploying a 40mm or a low lethal shotgun. The K-9 sergeant also directed officers to create distance.

After Officers Hilton and Mazon discharged their firearms, Patton took cover behind a power box located in the center median. Patton, still armed, then re-emerged and charged at officers. The K-9 sergeant then deployed his canine. When Officers Ward and Grazioso discharged their firearms, Patton fell to the ground. As this occurred, the K-9 sergeant provided direction to take Patton into custody. Once Patton was in custody, the K-9 sergeant directed officers to remove Patton's handcuffs, request medical, and begin life saving measures on Patton.

- The administrative reviewed determined the K-9 sergeant's incident management was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

A lieutenant monitored this event from the beginning and was assigned for the entire duration. The lieutenant was monitoring the radio channel when the first sergeant failed to give officers direction. Additionally, the lieutenant did not broadcast any information making it clear to responding sergeants or officers if Patton's vehicle met the vehicle pursuit criteria or if a vehicle pursuit was authorized.

- The administrative review determined the lieutenant's incident management and management of the pursuit were not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Additional Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations

Immediately after the OIS, officers on scene provided medical assistance by attempting to locate wounds and utilizing a tourniquet on Patton's right leg. As Patton was receiving medical treatment from officers, medical was called to respond to the scene. Patton was later pronounced deceased at the scene by medical personnel.

- The administrative review determined the medical response and intervention was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.