Purpose

The purpose of this report is to publish key findings, conclusions, and/or recommendations of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's (LVMPD) internal review of this incident. A variety of actions can be taken administratively in response to the Department's review of a deadly force incident. The review may reveal no action is required or determine additional training is appropriate for all officers in the workforce, or only for the involved officer(s). The review may reveal the need for changes in Department policies, procedures, or rules. Where departmental rules have been violated, formal discipline may be appropriate. The goal of the review is to improve both individual and Department performance.

Synopsis of Event

On October 27, 2020, at approximately 2333 hours, the LVMPD was involved in a critical incident under the LVMPD event LLV201000117694. The incident occurred in the 7-Eleven located at 2577 North Pecos Road, Las Vegas, Nevada 89115. This address was located within the LVMPD Northeast Area Command (NEAC); sector beat Frank 3 (F3).

The incident was an officer-involved shooting (OIS). Gang Crimes Bureau (GCB) Sergeant Steven Perry along with GCB Detectives Julien Pappas, Solon McGill, and Eric Stafford were the involved officers who discharged their firearms at suspect Maurice Parker, who was armed with a firearm (handgun). Parker was struck multiple times and was later pronounced deceased on-scene by medical units.

Prior to the OIS, LVMPD Communications received a ShotSpotter notification at approximately 1030 hours, near the 3300 block of Brussels Street, Las Vegas, NV 89169. After receiving the alert, LVMPD Communications received several 9-1-1 calls from citizens who observed a red sports utility vehicle (SUV) firing shots in an alley. Patrol officers arrived on scene, conducted a preliminary investigation for an Assault/Battery with a Gun incident, and later turned the investigation over to GCB detectives.

While conducting their investigation, GCB detectives learned Parker was the shooter from the red SUV. GCB detectives also learned Parker was violent, had a violent criminal history, was possibly armed with a firearm, and was currently working at the 7-Eleven located at 2577 North Pecos Road.

GCB detectives responded to a location near the 7-Eleven business and visually identified Parker at the front counter of the business. GCB detectives approached the 7-Eleven to take Parker into custody with a patrol sergeant and patrol officer's assistance.

GCB Sergeant Perry along with GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, Pappas, and the LVMPD patrol officer entered the 7-Eleven business. As they entered, Parker was still positioned at the front counter, behind a plexiglass barrier. GCB Sergeant Perry and GCB Detectives Stafford and McGill positioned themselves at the front counter. The counter and the plexiglass acted as a barrier and prevented access to Parker. GCB Detective Pappas and the patrol officer moved past GCB Sergeant Perry and the other GCB detectives and positioned themselves further inside the business at the employee counter entrance. As they entered and positioned themselves, all officers clearly displayed LVMPD identifiable markings.

At the counter, the patrol officer transitioned from his firearm to his electronic control device (ECD), giving the arrest team a potential option to de-escalate the situation. GCB detectives identified themselves verbally, and GCB Sergeant Perry issued verbal commands to Parker to put his hands on top of his head, interlock his fingers, stand up straight, and not move.

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Initially, Parker, with his back to the GCB detectives, complied with the verbal commands and placed his hands above his head. However, Parker quickly turned to his right, toward GCB Sergeant Perry and GCB Detectives Stafford and McGill. As Parker turned, he moved both of his hands down and toward his waist. With his right hand, Parker pulled a firearm he had concealed in his waistband. At this time, GCB Sergeant Perry and GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas discharged their firearms at Parker.

Parker was struck multiple times and immediately collapsed onto the floor of the 7-Eleven business. Moments later, the patrol sergeant broadcasted shots fired on the NEAC radio channel and requested medical. With the arrival of additional patrol officers, the patrol sergeant created a plan to safely approach Parker and take him into custody. Once in custody, Parker was placed in the recovery position and monitored by officers for signs of life. Medical personnel arrived, entered the business, and approached Parker. They began treating Parker but later pronounced him deceased at the scene.

The Criminal Investigation

The LVMPD's Force Investigation Team (FIT) conducted the criminal investigation of this incident. The investigation was submitted to the District Attorney's Office for review and determined, "no criminal prosecution of the officer or officers involved in the referenced case is appropriate."

For additional information related to the investigation of this incident, please refer to the LVMPD's FIT report and the Clark County District Attorney's Legal Analysis Report and/or the Clark County District Attorney's decision document.

LVMPD Administrative Review and Critical Incident Review Process

It is the policy of this Department to provide LVMPD and the community with a thorough review of incidents wherein deadly force was used by Department members. The Critical Incident Review Process (CIRP) includes the participation of citizen board members who reside within the LVMPD jurisdiction, who are not personally affiliated with the Department, who are not related to any of its members, and who have not had prior law enforcement experience.

The CIRP is comprised of two related boards whose sole purpose is to conduct comprehensive administrative review of the tactics utilized by involved Department members as well as decision-making, Department policy, training, supervision, and the use of deadly force.

The Use of Force Review Board (UFRB) consists of commissioned and citizen members. The Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) presents the facts related to the use of deadly force. The board issues findings regarding the actions of Department members who used, directly ordered, or directly influenced the use of deadly force, whether such force resulted in death or serious injury. The UFRB may choose from one of four findings after hearing the presentation of facts from CIRT. The findings are Administrative Approval, Tactics/Decision-Making, Policy/Training Failure, or Administrative Disapproval.

The Tactical Review Board (TRB) reviews CIRT conclusions. The TRB can validate, overturn, or modify the conclusions regarding the actions of Department members.

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The matter was heard by the UFRB and TRB on April 15, 2021. Below are the key findings, conclusions, and/or recommendations from the CIRP determined by the UFRB and TRB members and approved by the Sheriff.

Use of Force Review Board

UFRB: GCB Sergeant Steven Perry, GCB Detectives Julien Pappas, Solon McGill, and Eric Stafford

The board's finding was Administrative Approval for GCB Sergeant Perry and all GCB detectives. Administrative Approval is defined as: "objectively reasonable force was used under the circumstances, based on the information available to the officers at the time." This finding acknowledges that the use of force was justified and within Department policy.

Tactical Review Board

Communication

Communication can be verbal or non-verbal. It includes electronic transmission or in-person. A review of these recordings can provide valuable evidence of the circumstances surrounding a particular event.

A review of the NEAC radio traffic conducted during this incident was timely and pertinent.

• The administrative review determined the radio traffic for this incident was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

The overall dispatching and broadcast techniques utilized in this critical event were completed by the NEAC dispatchers. They accurately logged and documented information from various units involved in this event. Dispatchers and Dispatch supervisors correctly handled additional tasks related to the OIS.

• The administrative review determined the dispatching and broadcasting techniques by the NEAC dispatchers and supervisors were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

De-escalation

Policing requires that at times an officer must exercise control of a violent or resisting subject to make an arrest or to protect the officer, other officers, or members of the community from risk of harm. Clearly, not every potential violent confrontation can be de-escalated, but officers do have the ability to impact the direction and the outcome of many situations based on their decision-making and the tactics they choose to employ. As a strategy to diminish the likelihood and the severity of force, officers will attempt to deescalate confrontations.

During their investigation, GCB detectives learned Parker was the shooter from the red SUV, and he had a violent criminal history. They also learned Parker was working at a 7-Eleven less than a mile away from the GCB detectives' location, his shift ended at midnight, and he may be armed with a firearm. At approximately 2325 hours, GCB Sergeant Perry directed his GCB detectives from the apartment to the 7-Eleven to begin surveillance. GCB Detectives McGill and Stafford arrived and observed Parker inside the 7-Eleven.

At approximately 2329 hours, GCB Sergeant Perry and a patrol officer arrived at the 7-Eleven and one minute later a patrol sergeant arrived. At 2331 hours, GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB detectives, the patrol officer and patrol sergeant approached the front of the store. Prior to their approach, GCB Sergeant Perry and the patrol sergeant did not develop a plan on how they were going to approach the business and/or contact

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Parker. Roles and responsibilities were not assigned by the sergeants, such as which officer would provide/transition to a low lethal option or who would take Parker into custody should he comply.

• The administrative review determined the preplanning by GCB Sergeant Perry and the patrol sergeant was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

GCB Sergeant Perry parked on Pecos Road, south of 7-Eleven at approximately 2329 hours. Two minutes later, his team approached the business without consideration to withdraw to a tactically more secure position. The approach, led by GCB Sergeant Perry, put the GCB detectives and the patrol officer and patrol sergeant in a tactical disadvantage with Parker, who was a suspect in a shooting, documented with a violent criminal history, and possibly armed with a firearm.

• The administrative review determined that GCB Sergeant Perry's approach was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, Pappas, and the patrol officer entered the 7-Eleven and issued verbal commands to Parker with their firearms drawn. The patrol officer transitioned from his firearm to his electronic control device (ECD), giving the arrest team a potential option to de-escalate the situation.

• The administrative review determined the patrol officer's approach was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Once GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas, and the patrol officer, entered the 7-Eleven, they created a "Tactical L" with their positioning. GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB Detectives McGill and Stafford took a position in front of the counter, which provided a barrier between them and Parker, who was approximately 8-feet away. GCB Sergeant Perry issued verbal commands to Parker as GCB Detective Pappas and the patrol officer went behind the counter to establish containment.

The administrative review determined the contact and cover used by GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB
Detectives McGill, Stafford, Pappas, and the patrol officer were within standardized LVMPD tactics,
training, and policy.

During the incident, GCB Detective Pappas entered the 7-Eleven and walked past GCB Sergeant Perry, and GCB Detectives McGill and Stafford, toward the entrance of the counter. GCB Detective Pappas had several possibilities for cover and concealment available to him; however, he continued to close the distance toward Parker.

• The administrative review determined GCB Detective Pappas use of cover and concealment was not within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Use of Deadly Force

It is the policy of this Department that officers hold the highest regard for the dignity and liberty of all persons and place minimal reliance upon the use of force. The Department respects the sanctity of every human life, and the application of deadly force is a measure to be employed in the most extreme circumstances where lesser means of force have failed or could not be reasonably considered.

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The Department seeks to manage use of force beyond the Graham v. Connor (1989) standard and its minimum requirements by establishing further parameters for the application of force and to offer explicit direction to officers. Sound judgment, the appropriate exercise of discretion, and the adherence to Department policy will always be the foundation of officer decision-making in the broad range of possible use of force situations.

Officers will only use a level of force that is objectively reasonable to bring an incident or persons under control and to safely accomplish a lawful purpose. An officer's use of force must balance against the level of resistance exhibited by the subject. The level of force administered by an officer must be carefully controlled and should not be more than objectively reasonable to overcome the physical harm threatened.

In a confrontation, an officer will continuously reassess their response and adjust any use of force accordingly based upon the level of resistance encountered. Failure to reassess each application of force can lead to a violation of law and/or policy. The use of force by an officer must be within Department Policy which may be more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution.

When GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas approached the front entrance of the 7-Eleven, their firearms were drawn and the following was known: Parker was the shooter in a gangrelated shooting case; Parker was an employee and currently working at the 7-Eleven located at 2577 North Pecos Road; Parker was possibly armed with a firearm; Parker had an extensive violent criminal history.

• The administrative review determined GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas's drawing of their firearms was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

At the time GCB Sergeant Perry and GCB Detectives McGill and Stafford discharged their firearms at Parker, their backdrop was a large cement wall. When GCB Detective Pappas discharged his firearm at Parker, his backdrop was a large cement wall and the front window.

 The administrative review determined GCB Sergeant Perry and GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas's backdrop, target identification, and isolation were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

During the incident GCB Sergeant Perry and GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas discharged their firearms as Parker drew a firearm from his waistband and turned toward GCB Sergeant Perry, and GCB Detectives McGill and Stafford.

• The administrative review determined GCB Sergeant Perry, GCB Detectives McGill, Stafford, and Pappas's threat perceptions were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Incident Management

Supervisors will possess a thorough knowledge of tactics and ensure that officers under their supervision perform to a standard (in accordance with LVMPD policy and training). The prospect of a favorable outcome is often enhanced when supervisors become involved in the management of the overall response to a potentially violent encounter by coordinating officers' tactical actions.

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Supervisors will acknowledge and respond to incidents in a timely manner when officer use of reportable force is probable. Supervisors will also manage the deployment of resources and equipment. In dynamic and highly-charged incidents, supervisors will provide clear direction and communication to officers regarding their positioning and roles. Upon observing substandard officer approaches or flaws in tactical decisions, the supervisor will promptly act to correct any deficiencies.

In evaluating the supervision (command and control) of this incident, after the OIS, the patrol sergeant quickly slowed the momentum by accomplishing the following: broadcasted shots fired on the NEAC radio channel and provided real time information of what was occurring inside the store; requested medical respond to 7-Eleven; created a plan with patrol officers to safely approach Parker and take him into custody.

• The administrative review determined the supervisory response and incident management by the patrol sergeant after shots were fired were within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, and policy.

Additional Key Findings, Conclusions, and/or Recommendations

Medical was requested over the radio by the patrol sergeant immediately after shots were fired. The patrol sergeant ensured medical personnel did not enter the business until the scene was rendered safe. Once Parker was placed into handcuffs and put into the recovery position, he was monitored for signs of life. Medical personnel were then escorted into the 7-Eleven to provide medical aid; however, Parker was pronounced deceased at the scene.

• The administrative review determined the medical response in this incident was within standardized LVMPD tactics, training, policy.

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